U.S. Antitrust

The Brattle Group offers experience and capabilities covering a full range of antitrust matters, including mergers and acquisitions, allegations of price fixing and collusion, and various forms of alleged monopolization and anticompetitive behavior, including exclusion, predation, bundling, tying, cost-raising strategies, contracts referencing rivals, and alleged facilitating practices.

Brattle experts, many of whom have worked for either the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), have the experience to quickly identify the key economic issues and develop the pertinent economic theories and empirical analyses. This enables us to help collect evidence in the pre-discovery stage, provide rapid response during discovery, and analyze the evidence so that it can be used in a persuasive presentation before the court.

Our Focus
Competitive Effects of Exchanges or Sales of Airport Landing Slots
December 2011
James D. Reitzes, Brendan McVeigh, Nicholas E. Powers, and Samuel Moy
Published by The Brattle Group, Inc.
Is Delaware’s Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional? Evidence from 1988-2008
May 2010
Steven Herscovici, Guhan Subramanian, and Brian Barbetta
Published in The Business Lawyer
RPM as Exclusion: Did the U.S. Supreme Court Stumble Upon the Missing Theory of Harm?
December 2008
Published in Antitrust Bulletin
Difference in Differences Analysis in Antitrust: A Cautionary Note
John Simpson and David Schmidt
Published in Antitrust Law Journal
Bundled Discounts, Leverage Theory and Downstream Competition
October 2007
John Simpson and Abraham Wickelgren
Published in American Law and Economics Review
Naked Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition
September 2007
John Simpson and Abraham Wickelgren
Published in American Economic Review
Can Mergers to Monopoly, Price Fixing, and Market-Division Agreements Raise Welfare?
February 2004
James D. Reitzes and Paul S. Clyde
Published in International Journal of the Economics of Business